systems reliability strictly in technical terms. In contrast, Rasmussen recognized that the human operator had to be addressed together with the technological components as a unified construct.
3 Essentially, the challenge that Rasmussen faced was as follows:
how to characterize the human operator as a part of the high-risk nuclear system without reducing the person to a mechanistic cog, while ensuring that the overall system functioned correctly without any accidents.
Following Rasmussen's approach requires a special emphasis on the material dimension of the human as a component of high-risk systems. Significantly, Rasmussen's approach highlights three main interrelated aspects pertaining to the assimilation of the human as a system component (materiality of risk) between the years 1961-1983. 4 First, the redefinition of the problem of reliability to include the human; second, formulation of the concept of the human in technical terms; and finally, the characterization of human performance in light of the above two aspects.
Technical reliability refers to the ability of components, machines, or systems to function consistently in the manner for which they were designed. Traditionally, the problem of reliability during system operation was treated in terms of its technical aspects. However, technical design cannot address all unanticipated faults in the system. First, the designer may not be able to fully take stock of all combinations of rare emergent faults. Second, it may also not be economically feasible to provide extra equipment for very rare faults. Therefore, in contrast to a technical component, the flexible human operator could provide a decisive advantage in terms of decision making for handling rare, abnormal situations. However, introducing the operator as a system component has its drawbacks. The human is flexible but at times also prone to slips and mistakes: performance, Rasmussen found that operators often jump between the concepts they mentally hold while diagnosing the functioning of the technical system. These leaps are informed by a generalized "process feel" that the operators have towards the nuclear process plant functioning. Thus, a prominent need was to comprehend broader ways of recognizing human activity in technological contexts. 
